This article appeared as the lead article in the June 1997 issue of Fireworks Business published by American Fireworks News (AFN).

by Charles P. Weeth

The CPSC went public with a report with facts everyone in the trade has known for many years: that the estimated injuries related to fireworks has remained about the same, while the consumption of fireworks is has grown rapidly, so the estimated rate of injuries per 100,000 pounds of fireworks is now the lowest ever.

In March of 1996 the CPSC published their CPSC SUCCESS STORIES, which included sections on a variety of consumer product safety issues including CPSC Stops Hazardous Products At the Docks: Preventing Fireworks Injuries and Deaths. This section detailed the CPSC program to interdict "fireworks that violated fireworks regulations" in cooperation with the US Customs Service. It kept "an estimated 40 million pounds of fireworks from entering the United States between 1988 and 1994". (See Table 1).

Source: U.S. Customs Service

The report included the National Electronic Injury Survey Statistics (NEISS) estimates for fireworks related injuries, which were "almost 13,000 injuries treated in hospital emergency rooms in 1994; 9,000 injuries occurred in the month of July alone. Children under the age of 15 sustained more than 5,000 injuries from fireworks during this time period."

"These injuries can result in the loss of an eye, blindness, and even death. Yearly societal costs are estimated at $100 million."

The report also detailed the pending action on multiple tube fireworks and the new CPSC tipover standard.

1996 Estimates just in!

The CPSC estimate of fireworks-related injuries in 1996 is 7, 558, which is the lowest since 1978 and the lowest since the CPSC changed their survey sample in 1990

The CPSC also estimated 118 million pounds of fireworks shipped during the same time, a new consumption record, yielding an estimated injury rate of 6.4 per 100,000 pounds, which is the lowest in over 20 years!

Success Stories also confirmed "the risk of injury per 100,000 pounds of fireworks shipped has dropped substantially since the mid-1970's. The risk decreased from an average of 42.8 injuries per 100,000 pounds shipped in 1976-1978 to an average of 21.2 injuries per 100,000 pounds shipped in 1991-1993."

It also claimed that "Without the fireworks regulations and compliance activities, the number of injuries would have increased to approximately 27,000 injuries annually, about double the number of injuries from fireworks reported in 1994." (See Table 2).

Source: CPSC

The report also reviewed lead paint standards and the new cigarette lighter requirements, which by itself the CPSC projects "will produce $400 million in annual net benefits to society, preventing up to 100 deaths and several hundred injuries and millions of dollars in property damage each year."

Other sections dealt with CPSC efforts on the child-resistant packaging for mouthwashes and medication toxic to children, on toy safety labeling and the action pending action on bicycle helmets. The report was written by N. J. Scheers, Ph.D, a CPSC staff member.

FB queried the CPSC about this data and their sources for the report, as well as the method for some of the conclusions it made.

The CPSC responded that "Of the 9,080 estimated fireworks injuries in U.S. hospital emergency rooms during the June 23 to July 23, 1994 survey period: about 23% were large (illegal) firecrackers, e.g. M-80s; 6% were homemade fireworks; and 4% were public displays. Pipe bombs were not included in the survey."

This hardly sounds as ominous as the initial report and raises the question: If the majority of serious injuries are coming from banned fireworks, then why is there a need to seize fireworks at the docks?

When asked to explain how they determined how many pounds of fireworks were shipped in the US and what percentage were domestic vs. imported and consumer vs. display, the CPSC responded with: "Consumer estimates were estimated as two-thirds of the total shipments" and "the annual totals included both domestic and imported fireworks." (See Table 3).

*Display Fireworks = Total - Consumer Fireworks

Source: CPSC

The CPSC was also asked why this report showed a different rate for some of the earlier years, but a response has not been received as of press time. This report indicates a rate of 57.5 for 1976 when earlier reports indicate a rate of 38.3, a significant difference.

The CPSC claims the seize and destroy program is a "success" which indicates the primary intent of the program: It is an easy way to score political points with those who have lots of clout on Capitol Hill, such as the American Medical Association (AMA), the National Safety Council (NSC) and others. It also is a quick and cheap way to force changes without actually having to research the real problems and work out potential solutions in a cooperative partnership with that industry.

The question remains whether the seized fireworks were truly in violation, given the sampling methods of the shipments and the testing methods of those samples. The CPSC has not provided the detailed methodology for their sampling method and why it is representative of an entire shipment; or allowed anyone outside of the CPSC to witness the tests they perform on the samples taken. Both raise serious questions about their validity.

Even for those "fireworks that violated fireworks regulations", the CPSC has not demonstrated that they posed any increased risk to the public if placed on the market; only that they were in violation.

The fact a particular shipment may have had a sample with an average over the composition weight limits, or with fuse burn times only tenths of a second outside the parameters, or labels that weren't current, do not in and of themselves demonstrate a significant increase in risk.

This is especially true with consumer fireworks because the significant majority of estimated injuries related to fireworks are from misuse and not product malfunction; something the CPSC is aware of but seems to forget.

The CPSC claims about potential benefits from their actions are speculative at best. The CPSC Injury Cost Model contains a number of assumptions about the nature and extent of the injuries and subjective criteria that make them difficult to assess accurately.

There also have been serious questions regarding the NEISS estimates which are the basis for most CPSC conclusions and actions. In separate papers presented at the 3rd International Symposium on Fireworks by this author and by Julie Heckman of the APA, it was detailed that at least 40% of the NEISS come from non-consumer fireworks such as M-80s and homemade fireworks, as well as display fireworks.

Thus the risk rates per 100,000 pounds are actually much lower than the CPSC reports!

It is clear the CPSC will take whatever data they generate from whatever sources and put the best possible spin on it so it reflects best on the CPSC. This is not unexpected, but it shows the importance of having the CPSC provide information so it can be independently interpreted.

The CPSC Success Stories also made serious errors of omission in claiming the success in the injury rate per 100,000 was due exclusively to CPSC action.

It fails to point out that the CPSC first planned to ban all consumer fireworks, which would have resulted in a larger underground fireworks industry beyond the reach of any responsible regulations. Given that the majority of serious injuries come from banned fireworks, had this total ban occurred in 1976, the injury rates most likely would be higher than they are now.

The CPSC also fails to acknowledge that it was the labeling and construction standards the APA proposed in 1976 that have led to the improved situation found today.

The CPSC Success Stories tacitly recognize what Dr. John Conkling of the APA reported many years ago: that the relatively stable injury rates compared to rapidly increased consumption rates meant the risk of injury was declining rapidly. They also underscore the extraordinary efforts of the APA and lately, the AFSL, that have yielded these much lower injury rates.

This lower injury rate has been accomplished through constantly improving the standards, increased consumer education and aggressive marketing of low-cost, higher quality fireworks. This has made the clandestine market, which is the source of the fireworks that lead to the majority of serious injuries, a shadow of its former self.

The industry is more than willing to cooperate with the CPSC. It welcomes reasonable standards and testing to meet those standards, but it must know what is required of them by the CPSC before they go to production and ship to market. Furthermore, the trade has every right to expect fair and impartial treatment along with due course when a shipment is seized, or standards or testing criteria change without industry input or reasonable notice.

If the CPSC is really after lower injury rates, it would behoove the CPSC to spend as much time, energy and resources cooperating with the trade, as it does scaring the hell out of people blowing up watermelons with M-80s on TV. This constant Inside the Beltway game so their budget doesn’t get slashed does little for public safety, and only belittles a legitimate, useful and important industry.

The CPSC has and can play a useful role in protecting the public, but it has to do better than this to be considered a real success.

If you would like a copy of CPSC SUCCESS STORIES, write to the CPSC, Washington, DC 20207

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Revised July 17, 1998